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Bacterial cooperation through horizontal
gene transfer
Isaiah Paolo A. Lee, 1 Omar Tonsi Eldakar, 2 J. Peter Gogarten, 3,* and Cheryl P. Andam
Cooperation exists across all scales of biological organization, from genetic elements to complex human societies. Bacteria cooperate by secreting molecules
that beneﬁt all individuals in the population (i.e., public goods). Genes associated
with cooperation can spread among strains through horizontal gene transfer
(HGT). We discuss recent ﬁndings on how HGT mediated by mobile genetic elements promotes bacterial cooperation, how cooperation in turn can facilitate
more frequent HGT, and how the act of HGT itself may be considered as a form
of cooperation. We propose that HGT is an important enforcement mechanism in
bacterial populations, thus creating a positive feedback loop that further maintains
cooperation. To enforce cooperation, HGT serves as a homogenizing force by
transferring the cooperative trait, effectively eliminating cheaters.

Evolution of cooperation
Cooperation has evolved many times across the Tree of Life and at all levels of biological organization, from genes forming genomes, to cells forming multicellular organisms, to eusocial insects
forming superorganisms, and even to different species forming communities [1–3]. However,
social adaptations such as cooperation are not always locally advantageous, making their
prevalence puzzling to researchers for decades [4–6]. Several explanations for this social evolutionary paradox have since been developed; however, the same underlying concept holds:
prosocial behavior beneﬁts the collective, whereas selﬁshness provides a local advantage to
individuals within collectives [5–7]. Charles Darwin described this notion in his observation that
morality gives little to no advantage to an individual over another of the same tribe, yet will give
an immense advantage to one tribe over another [4]. This multilevel selection framework requires
that the beneﬁts of cooperation go mostly towards other cooperators than to their selﬁsh counterparts [5]. This can occur through sorting, kinship, conformance, or enforcement strategies
such as punishment, which all increase the likelihood that a cooperator is interacting with, and
thus beneﬁting, other cooperators [5,7]. We propose that the transfer of genes in bacteria is
unique in that it serves as driver, product, and form of cooperation.
In bacteria, cooperation is often in the form of public goods whereby their production beneﬁts all
individuals [8,9]. These public goods are vulnerable to exploitation by individuals that beneﬁt from
their production but do not share in the costs. Nonetheless, it is not clear under which conditions
bacterial cooperation is favored and whether it is an evolutionary stable strategy (i.e., a strategy
that when adopted by most individuals in a population cannot be invaded and replaced by a
deviating strategy) [10]. For example, Oliveira et al. found that stable cooperation through
reciprocal exchange was unlikely to emerge in evolving microbial communities; however, most
bacteria and archaea live under conditions of poor genetic mixing not explored in this study
[11]. In addition, cooperation in bacteria includes an interesting caveat, as many cooperative
genes are carried on mobile genetic elements. Here, cooperators beneﬁt those around them,
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and at the same time, this transfer of genes also increases the likelihood that individuals receiving
the beneﬁts become cooperators themselves.

Costs of public good genes
Public goods were conceptualized in economics as goods that are non-rivalrous and nonexcludable [12,13]. This means that using them does not detract from their consumption by
other individuals and that they are available for everyone to use [12]. In humans, examples of public
goods include national defense, sanitation, and street lighting. In other organisms, the concept of
public goods is sometimes relaxed to include common-pool resources with rivalrous consumption
[14]. Public goods in bacterial populations may include extracellular digestive enzymes,
siderophores for iron scavenging, antibiotics used in bacterial warfare, antibiotic-degrading
enzymes, surfactants for bacterial mobility, and molecules that function in virulence, quorum
sensing, bioﬁlm formation, and light production [2,8]. Proteins can provide a public service or
leaky functions even if the encoded protein itself is not secreted from the cell [15].
The nature of public goods can lead to the free-rider problem, whereby some individuals capitalize on the public goods secreted by others (i.e., cheaters) [16,17]. These non-producers enjoy a
relative ﬁtness advantage over producers as they reap the beneﬁts of cooperation without sharing
in the costs. Over time, non-producers outcompete producers in the population, undermining
cooperation in the population [18,19]. Such scenarios exist in both unregulated economies
of human society [20,21] and bacterial populations. For instance, the opportunistic pathogen
Pseudomonas aeruginosa scavenges iron through siderophores, a secreted public good [22].
In long-term lung infections, some strains have been observed to mutationally lose their ability
to produce siderophores, giving rise to a cheater phenotype. This consequently leads to the
collapse of cooperative social behavior over time [22].
Some cellular functions incur high energetic or nutritional costs. The metabolic cost of gene product
synthesis can inhibit bacterial growth [23,24], with some biosynthetic genes more costly to keep
than others [25]. Strains that stop performing these costly functions and eventually lose the corresponding genes have a local advantage [15]. While gene loss due to drift is known in bacteria, especially in host-restricted taxa [26,27], genome reduction also occurs in bacteria with very large
effective population sizes, such as the marine-dwelling Synechococcus and Roseobacter [28,29].
Selective pressure to lose genes could be due to general genome streamlining caused by deletion
bias observed in bacterial genomes [30], a possible way to purge them of selﬁsh genetic elements
[31]. Some public good genes may even result in host death when expressed. For example, the
anti-competitor toxin colicin is released through self-lysis in Escherichia coli [32] and Salmonella
enterica [33]. Self-lysis also occurs in the release of anti-predator Shiga toxin in E. coli [34].
The Black Queen hypothesis has been proposed to explain how selection for reduced genomes
impacts the dynamics of public goods in bacteria. For functions that provide an indispensable
public good, a fraction of individuals retain the genes that encode these functions and thus support
the entire community through leakage [15]. Leaky public goods that become available to the rest of
the community will lead to functional dependencies [15,35]. Hence, while these functions are not
completely lost from the community, cooperation between producers and non-producers is maintained. The Black Queen hypothesis therefore predicts an overall trend towards ‘mutual cheating’
[35], highlighting the apparent paradox in the ubiquity of public good genes in bacteria [8]. Mutual
cheating may also explain the conservation of gene content and functions of microbial communities, despite taxonomic variability within communities [36,37]. However, division of labor may be
a more appropriate description, especially in those cases where a keystone strain or species is
no longer present in the population and all individuals in the population are dependent on some
2
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common good produced by others (i.e., strong Black Queen hypothesis [15,35]). The stable
coexistence of producers and consumers, including cheaters of cheaters, of leaky products
such as siderophores has been demonstrated in P. aeruginosa [38,39].

HGT introduces and maintains genes in a population
Bacteria are notable in their predilection towards HGT, the acquisition of genes between organisms
through mechanisms other than vertical descent from a common ancestor [40]. Horizontally transferred genes can impact the ﬁtness of the recipient and allow it to enter new ecological niches
unavailable to it through mutation alone [41–43]. Conversely, genes with neutral or nearly neutral
effects may also be frequently transferred [44,45]. The probability of ﬁxation or elimination of
these neutral acquisitions in the population will be determined by genetic drift [44,46], and in the
case of selﬁsh genetic elements, on the frequency they are transferred within a population
[47,48]. Whether horizontally acquired genes are positively selected or neutral, they create a
remarkably diverse and constantly changing pool of novel genetic combinations for which selection
to act on [40,49].
Genes are easily acquired and lost in microbes [50,51]. This interplay of gene loss and gain results
in a dynamic pan-genome, with individual strains carrying distinct sets of genes [52–54]. Interstrain variability in gene content can arise through rapid gene gain and loss in response to neutral
evolution or selection to survive in variable environments. A dynamic pan-genome enables
the rapid addition of potentially adaptive genes and replacement of unfavored ones in a local
environment at a rate that would not be possible without mobile elements [40,55]. This is notable
for cooperative genes whose ﬁtness payoffs depend heavily on local environmental conditions,
such as population composition [56,57]. For example, Cry toxins are insecticidal proteins
produced as crystal inclusions during the sporulation phase of bacterial growth and are considered
as public goods with a high metabolic cost to produce [58]. Rapid gain and loss, mediated by
plasmids, have been observed in genes that encode the Cry toxins among Bacillus species [58].
HGT therefore favors cooperative genes to invade and persist in a population.
It has long been hypothesized that plasmids (extra-chromosomal replicons) are maintained in
populations due to their selective advantages. These might be due to locally adaptive genes
they carry or the increased mobility of conditionally adaptive traits [47,59]. However, plasmid
carriage often imposes a reduction in ﬁtness to its bacterial host [47,60]. In response, conjugative
plasmids have devised unique ways to persist in their host cells, even when the two come into
conﬂict. These include self-mobilization, partition systems, multimer resolution systems, and
post-segregational killing of cells without plasmids [47,61]. To persist in the population, plasmids
must therefore depend on either or both ﬁtness cost amelioration and HGT, with plasmids having
traits of both parasites and mutualists [62,63].
Plasmids can persist in the population even in the absence of selective pressures, as demonstrated in an experimental assay of conjugation plasmids in E. coli [64]. While costly, plasmids
of different incompatibility groups are rapidly transferred, such that antibiotic resistance genes
carried by these plasmids persist even in the absence of antibiotics [64]. Similarly, HGT allows
antibiotic resistance genes to persist at low frequencies in the naturally competent gut microbe
Helicobacter pylori even in the absence of antibiotics [65]. A recent mathematical model has
also shown that genes with small ﬁtness beneﬁts that would otherwise be lost from the population
without HGT persist or are rescued, despite the costs incurred by selﬁsh genetic elements [66].
However, such scenarios occur only in spatially structured environments (Box 1), such as bioﬁlms
[66] (Box 2). The complexity of microbial communities might therefore promote plasmid persistence because of multiple sources and sinks of plasmid transfer [59,67,68].
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Box 1. Dynamics of public good genes in structured populations
Since the inception of evolutionary game theory, stable cooperation has been associated with population structure [78,79].
Cooperators have to interact with other cooperators more often than they would by chance, avoiding the net ﬁtness
penalty of cooperation [100]. This depends on selection at the level of groups of cooperating individuals, whereby genetic
relatedness may not necessarily be at play [101,102]. Both experimental systems and mathematical models have shown
that cooperative plasmids alone are not sufﬁcient to maintain cooperation. Some degree of population structure is
therefore required [92,103].
Population structure need not be constant. Changes in population viscosity can allow for the evolution of different types of
cooperation [104]. The coevolution of population structure and cooperation has been proposed and subsequently
demonstrated in mathematical models of Snowdrift and Prisoner’s Dilemma games [105,106], with bioﬁlms being a
proposed example of this [107,108], as elaborated on in Box 3. HGT within groups can act as a mechanism to change
population structure by increasing similarity between individuals in a population, which in turn increases between-group
differences and accelerates group selection. A higher rate of HGT can thus be selected both to spread more public good
genes and to increase relatedness between bacteria [109]. Biased plasmid transfer increases inclusive ﬁtness and can lead
to selection for higher rates of HGT. Biased transfer can be the result of population structure or recipient discrimination
[110], as in the case of kin-biased plasmid transfer in E. coli [111]. B. subtilis also possesses kin discrimination systems,
where many of the genes encoding antimicrobial compounds involved in discrimination are located on mobile genetic
elements [112]. These studies suggest that HGT inﬂuences the evolution of kin groups.

The ability to maintain genes in a population might be especially useful for traits that are difﬁcult to
re-evolve via mutation once they are lost. This applies to some cooperative traits, as in the case of
P. aeruginosa, where the loss of the siderophore pyoverdine was not recovered, even with
increased spatial structure and reduced cost of public good production [69]. HGT may also act
in concert with the physical arrangement of genes in the genome to prevent gene loss. The selﬁsh
operon hypothesis posits that genes coding for weakly selected functions physically cluster
together due to HGT, so they can be donated [70,71]. Selﬁsh operon theory can explain horizontally transferred gene clusters, such as genomic islands found in a variety of species [71–73],
although its relative importance is a point of debate [74,75]. Widespread HGT can thus prevent
the loss of a trait or reintroduce it if lost.

Mobile genetic elements as an enforcement mechanism
Cooperation requires enforcement to evolve and thrive. Although enforcement strategies may vary,
enforcement ensures that the self-serving behavior of some members of the group is reduced

Box 2. Public goods and HGT in bioﬁlms
The population structure described in Box 1 often manifests itself in physically distinct populations. Most bacterial and
archaeal cells live in bioﬁlms or small aggregates [113]. They are therefore more likely to be physically adjacent to cells with
whom they share recent ancestry and more likely to have the same genotype with respect to leaky functions. These
neighborhood relations are expected to increase frequency-dependent selection on genes encoding these functions.
Drescher et al. [114] showed that chitinase-secreting Vibrio cholerae can avoid the public goods dilemma by strengthening
relationships between cells of the same genotype through creation of a thick bioﬁlm, leading to larger beneﬁts to the
producers when the overall concentration of the public good decreases. While the cheater strain has a ﬁtness advantage
over the cooperators at low frequencies, it has a ﬁtness disadvantage at high frequencies. This shows that genes encoding
common goods can be under frequency-dependent selection, which could lead to local feedback loops that promote the
coexistence of different cheaters.
Bioﬁlms are also hotspots for HGT events facilitated by a variety of transfer mechanisms, including conjugation, nanotubes,
natural transformation, phages, and membrane vesicles [115–117]. Bioﬁlms also provide physical means to structure
bacterial communities and therefore set physical boundaries for HGT [118,119]. Conjugative plasmids can directly induce
bioﬁlm formation in bacteria, ﬁrst demonstrated in an E. coli laboratory strain [120]. Non-conjugative plasmids have also
been shown to affect bioﬁlm formation [121]. In turn, bioﬁlm growth can result in a greater copy number of plasmids
[122] and more persistent plasmids [117,123], raising the possibility of positive feedback loops formed by this interaction
[124]. Bioﬁlms can therefore lead to enhanced cooperation. In E. coli, more cooperative resistance from a plasmidencoded β-lactamase has been reported in bioﬁlms compared to liquid cultures [125]. Mobile elements can therefore
promote cooperation not just by carrying public good genes, but by inducing environmental conditions favorable for
cooperation, such as bioﬁlms [119].
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[76,77]. Through his inclusive ﬁtness theory, Hamilton ﬁrst proposed that relatedness between
interacting organisms can favor cooperation even when costly to the individual [78,79]. Inclusive ﬁtness theory has since been expanded to include general models taking individual genes into account
[80,81]. Spatial structure of a population can also allow cooperation to evolve [56,57], even without
considering relatedness [7,80]. Spatial self-organization of the population can also sustain cooperation through repeated colonization, even when the costs for cooperation are high [82,83]. Enforcement can also take the form of policing [84,85] or the repression of competition within groups
[86,87]. Other enforcement mechanisms in bacteria include quorum sensing and antagonistic
pleiotropy [9].
We propose that HGT is also an important enforcement mechanism in bacterial populations.
Figure 1 shows HGT impeding the invasion of a cheater in a cooperating bacterial population.
A mutant cheater strain arises in a cooperating population (Panel A) through a random loss-offunction mutation (Panel B). In the absence of HGT as an enforcement mechanism, the cheater
can invade the population (Panel C) and undermine public good production, resulting in the
ﬁtness loss of the overall population (Panel D). With HGT, the mutant cheater is converted into
a cooperator by reintroducing the functional allele (Panel E), thus rescuing cooperation (Panel F).
The concept of HGT as an enforcement mechanism was ﬁrst hypothesized in the context of acute
infection within and between hosts described using a differential equation model [88]. In this

Trends in Ecology & Evolution

Figure 1. Cooperative bacterial population invaded by a cheater, with and without horizontal gene transfer.
(A) Bacteria secrete extracellular proteins (orange dots), a public good, to protect themselves from an antimicrobial agent
(red triangle). (B) A non-producing cheater (blue cell) arises in the population as a result of a loss-of-function mutation.
(C) Due to its ﬁtness advantage, the cheater strain invades the population. The presence of the public good produced by
the remaining cooperators enables the survival of the cheaters. (D) In the absence of cooperators to produce enough of
the public good, the cheaters are killed by the antimicrobial agent. The size of the population is signiﬁcantly reduced as a
result. (E) In the presence of horizontal gene transfer, cooperator strains can transfer a functional allele into the cheater
strain. The loss-of-function mutation is rescued as a result. (F) In the absence of cheaters, the population remains immune
to the antimicrobial agent.
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model, selection for infectious transmission favored pathogens that can force cheater strains
to produce the virulence factor (i.e., public good secreted extracellularly) via HGT [88]. These
ﬁndings were supported by investigations in a variety of bacterial species that made use of genomic data [89,90], simulations [89,91], and experimental work [69,92]. Other cooperative traits
such as virulence factors, toxins, and detoxiﬁcation proteins are also frequently found on mobile
elements [93], and may facilitate evolutionary rescue of some genes [94]. More recently, a larger
survey of 5397 bacterial genomes across several taxa conﬁrmed the overrepresentation of genes
coding for secreted proteins on plasmids [90]. However, we note that leaky functions do not
necessarily require the protein catalyzing this function to be secreted (see section on Costs of
public good genes).
The role of plasmid-mediated HGT in the context of bacterial cooperation remains unsettled.
Two recent preprint studies describe other factors that inﬂuence the presence and mobility
of plasmids, such as virulence traits. A genomic analysis of 51 bacterial species reported
that HGT might help cooperation to initially invade a population but does not help in maintaining
cooperation in the long term [95]. An experimental study of a master regulator of virulence
inserted into a conjugative plasmid demonstrated the emergence of cooperative virulence,
but its stability depended on transmission dynamics [96]. The role of population structure
and time scales being studied may explain these discrepancies. HGT might cause cooperation
to appear short-term in local populations, without necessarily maintaining it across a species.
Future work is needed to explore patterns of transfer of other mobile genetic elements, such as
chromosomal cassettes, transposons, integrons, and phages. Since interactions between
different mobile elements can facilitate their transfer, broader sampling may present a clearer
picture of HGT [97,98].
Many extracellular toxins that function as public goods are also associated with mobile elements.
In E. coli, colicin is a plasmid-encoded toxin used in bacterial warfare, where it causes lysis in both
cells expressing it and neighboring cells exposed to it [32]. Since colicin results in a loss of reproductive potential, it is rarely expressed. Cells thus bet-hedge, with colicin silenced within most of
them [99]. In S. enterica serovar Typhimurium, colicin is phage-encoded and also causes selflysis [33]. Phage-mediated bet-hedging has been observed, with HGT hypothesized as maintaining the evolutionary stability of colicin production [33]. HGT can therefore cause phenotypic
heterogeneity associated with bet-hedging due to the frequent gain and loss of traits. Another
example is the Shiga toxin in E. coli, a phage-encoded anti-predator molecule. It is also secreted
and causes self-lysis when expressed [34], thereby functioning as a public good. Due to the
mobility of the phages encoding Shiga toxin, susceptible non-cooperating bacteria can be
induced to produce it, enforcing cooperation in the population [34]. These examples demonstrate
how the transfer of mobile elements coding for public goods can enforce their expression in
phage-susceptible cells, and thus the cooperation among members of the population (Box 3).

Concluding remarks
Evidence exists for a positive relationship between gene mobility and cooperation, although
primarily focused on plasmids. Direct investigations of genetic recombination and of other mobile
genetic elements are lacking. Given how the prevalence of HGT itself is evolvable, such as
through the construction of structured microbial communities, conceptualizing HGT as a dynamic
parameter in the evolution of cooperation is warranted. The relationship between bacterial
cooperation and HGT could lead to a positive feedback loop, whereby HGT and cooperation
maintain each other in the population. Finally, the study of HGT as an act of cooperation in itself
seems appealing, but the ﬁtness costs of HGT itself should be investigated. The availability of
whole-genome sequence data will lead to more comprehensive surveys of mobile genetic
6
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Outstanding questions
Are the differences in the frequency of
HGT and accessory gene content
among bacterial taxa and among
strains due to differences in their propensity for cooperation?
What are the ﬁtness costs associated
with HGT? Are these costs primarily
due to the carriage of potentially
harmful genes, or are they due to the
act of transfer itself?
Cooperative traits increase the ﬁtness
of a group, allowing for increased
population density. Does this increased
ﬁtness always translate to more
frequent HGT?
To what extent do other types of
mobile genetic elements, such as
phages, transposons, gene cassette,
and integrons, facilitate cooperation in
bacterial populations?
How do different mechanisms of transfer
(conjugation, transformation, transduction, homologous recombination, and
illegitimate recombination) inﬂuence the
cooperative behaviors between strains?
To what extent do biases in HGT
partners (due to phylogenetic, geographical, or ecological proximity)
enhance or hinder cooperation in a
population?
Are there differences in the distribution
of public goods and cooperative
behaviors during asymptomatic
carriage and disease?
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Box 3. Horizontal gene transfer as second-order cooperation
The free-rider problem, by which a population loses a cooperative function due to individuals having no incentive to maintain it
[18,19], can be remedied in populations by enforcing cooperation [77]. This makes enforcement itself an act of cooperation
and the enforcement system a public good [126]. Individuals may opt to punish non-cooperators even when doing so incurs
a cost, leading to ‘altruistic punishment’ [127,128]. However, the ﬁtness cost may lead to the second-order free-rider
problem, whereby individuals who do not punish non-cooperators outcompete punishers. How these enforcement systems
evolve is an exciting new ﬁeld of study [127–129].
The production of cooperative offspring can be a form of second-order cooperation, with the comparative rates of production
of cooperators and non-cooperators being an evolvable trait [130]. In cooperating populations of bacteria, population structures with high levels of relatedness select against hypermutators, favoring the continued transmission of the cooperative
phenotype [131,132]. The same principles that apply to the vertical inheritance of cooperative traits should also therefore
apply to HGT, with HGT acting against mutation in cooperative populations.
Mobile genetic elements, such as plasmids, often have ﬁtness costs to their hosts. This can be due to cargo genes not
being adaptive or conﬂicts between these elements and the hosts [133,134]. The costs may also vary depending on
the mobile elements, the host, and their interactions [134,135]. The ﬁtness changes associated with random horizontally
transferred DNA fragments may range from maladaptive to neutral to adaptive [51,60,68]. The act of conjugation itself
may also carry ﬁtness costs [136]. Horizontally transferred genes can also either cooperate with or antagonize their host
genomes [137]. While maintaining HGT may thus be a costly public good in some cases, such as in the case of conjugative
plasmids that have evolved persistence mechanisms in opposition to their hosts, the costs may be reduced when mobile
elements and their host genomes coevolve towards stable mutualism [47,68,137]. Future work is needed to better
understand the second-order free-rider problem in the context of maintaining HGT.

elements and public good genes across various microbial taxa. These phenomena are mechanistically distinct yet dynamically intertwined, feeding into each other to produce the rich tapestry of
bacterial sociobiology (see Outstanding questions).
Acknowledgments
C.P.A. is supported by the National Science Foundation (Award no. 2055120) and start-up funds from the University at
Albany College of Arts and Sciences. J.P.G. is supported by the National Science Foundation (Award no. 1716046). I.P.A.L.
is supported by the University of New Hampshire 2021 Summer Teaching Assistant Fellowship. The funders had no role in
the conceptualization, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. I.P.A.L. would like to thank Beatriz Andrea Choi
Tan for creating Figure 1. The authors are also grateful to Cooper J. Park and Joshua T. Smith for useful discussions and
thoughtful suggestions during the preparation of the manuscript.

Authors' contributions
C.P.A. and I.P.A.L. developed the concept and wrote the initial manuscript. All authors read, discussed, edited, and
approved the ﬁnal manuscript.

Declaration of interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

References
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

West, S.A. et al. (2007) Evolutionary explanations for cooperation.
Curr. Biol. 17, R661–R672
West, S.A. et al. (2006) Social evolution theory for microorganisms.
Nat. Rev. Microbiol. 4, 597–607
Leigh, E.G. (1991) Genes, bees and ecosystems: the evolution
of a common interest among individuals. Trends Ecol. Evol. 6,
257–262
DarwinThe descent of man, and selection in relation to sex
(Vol. 1, 1st edn), John MurrayJohn MurrayThe descent of
man, and selection in relation to sex (Vol. 1, 1st edn), John
Murray
Wilson, D.S. and Wilson, E.O. (2007) Rethinking the theoretical
foundation of sociobiology. Q. Rev. Biol. 82, 327–348
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W.D. (1981) The evolution of
cooperation. Science 211, 1390–1396
Eldakar, O.T. and Wilson, D.S. (2011) Eight criticisms not to
make about group selection. Evolution 65, 1523–1526

8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

Smith, P. and Schuster, M. (2019) Public goods and cheating
in microbes. Curr. Biol. 29, R442–R447
Özkaya, Ö. et al. (2017) Maintenance of microbial cooperation
mediated by public goods in single- and multiple-trait scenarios.
J. Bacteriol. 199, e00297–e00317
Smith, J.M. and Price, G.R. (1973) The logic of animal conﬂict.
Nature 246, 15–18
Oliveira, N.M. et al. (2014) Evolutionary limits to cooperation in
microbial communities. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 111,
17941–17946
Samuelson, P.A. (1954) The pure theory of public expenditure.
Rev. Econ. Stat. 36, 387–389
Ihori, T. (2017) The theory of public goods. In Principles of Public
Finance (Ihori, T., ed.), pp. 295–327, Springer
Levin, S.A. (2014) Public goods in relation to competition,
cooperation, and spite. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 111,
10838–10845

Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month 2021, Vol. xx, No. xx

7

Trends in Ecology & Evolution
OPEN ACCESS

15.

16.

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.

25.
26.

27.

28.

29.

30.
31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.
39.

40.

8

Morris, J.J. et al. (2012) The Black Queen hypothesis: evolution
of dependencies through adaptive gene loss. mBio 3,
e00036–e00112
Sarkar, S. and Benjamin, C. (2019) Entanglement renders free
riding redundant in the thermodynamic limit. Physica A 521,
607–613
Hernandez, P. and Alventosa, A. (2018) Coordination concerns:
concealing the free rider problem. In Game Theory - Applications
in Logistics and Economy (Tuljak-Suban, D., ed.), IntechOpen
Andreoni, J. (1988) Why free ride?: Strategies and learning in
public goods experiments. J. Public Econ. 37, 291–304
Hardin, R. (1971) Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners’
dilemma. Behav. Sci. 16, 472–481
Besley, T. (2020) State capacity, reciprocity, and the social
contract. ECTA 88, 1307–1335
Gross, J. and De Dreu, C.K.W. (2019) Individual solutions to
shared problems create a modern tragedy of the commons.
Sci. Adv. 5, eaau7296
Andersen, S.B. et al. (2015) Long-term social dynamics drive
loss of function in pathogenic bacteria. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U. S. A. 112, 10756–10761
Ruparell, A. et al. (2016) The ﬁtness burden imposed by
synthesising quorum sensing signals. Sci. Rep. 6, 33101
Wortel, M.T. et al. (2018) Metabolic enzyme cost explains
variable trade-offs between microbial growth rate and yield.
PLoS Comput. Biol. 14, e1006010
Pinhal, S. et al. (2019) Acetate metabolism and the inhibition of
bacterial growth by acetate. J. Bacteriol. 201, e00147–e00219
Mondal, S.I. et al. (2020) Reduced genome of the gut symbiotic
bacterium “Candidatus Benitsuchiphilus tojoi” provides insight
into its possible roles in ecology and adaptation of the host insect.
Front. Microbiol. 11, 840
Kinjo, Y. et al. (2021) Enhanced mutation rate, relaxed selection, and the “domino effect” are associated with gene loss in
Blattabacterium, a cockroach endosymbiont. Mol. Biol. Evol.
38, 3820–3831
Feng, X. et al. (2021) Mechanisms driving genome reduction of
a novel Roseobacter lineage. ISME J. Published online June
18, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41396-021-01036-3
Lee, M.D. et al. (2019) Marine Synechococcus isolates representing
globally abundant genomic lineages demonstrate a unique
evolutionary path of genome reduction without a decrease in
GC content. Environ. Microbiol. 21, 1677–1686
Sela, I. et al. (2016) Theory of prokaryotic genome evolution.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 113, 11399–11407
Guo, Y. et al. (2020) Mycoavidus sp. Strain B2-EB: comparative genomics reveals minimal genomic features required by a
cultivable Burkholderiaceae-related endofungal bacterium.
Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 86, e01018–e01020
Granato, E.T. and Foster, K.R. (2020) The evolution of
mass cell suicide in bacterial warfare. Curr. Biol. 30,
2836–2843.e3
Spriewald, S. et al. (2020) Evolutionary stabilization of cooperative
toxin production through a bacterium–plasmid–phage interplay.
mBio 11, e00912–e00920
Aijaz, I. and Koudelka, G.B. (2019) Cheating, facilitation, and
cooperation regulate the effectiveness of phage-encoded
exotoxins as antipredator molecules. Microbiologyopen 8,
e00636
Fullmer, M.S. et al. (2015) The pan-genome as a shared genomic resource: mutual cheating, cooperation, and the Black
Queen hypothesis. Front. Microbiol. 6, 728
Doolittle, W.F. and Booth, A. (2017) It’s the song, not the
singer: an exploration of holobiosis and evolutionary theory.
Biol. Philos. 32, 5–24
Louca, S. et al. (2016) High taxonomic variability despite stable
functional structure across microbial communities. Nat. Ecol.
Evol. 1, 15
Özkaya, Ö. et al. (2018) Cheating on cheaters stabilizes cooperation in Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Curr. Biol. 28, 2070–2080.e6
Zhao, K. et al. (2019) Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing
can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations. BMC
Biol. 17, 20
Soucy, S.M. et al. (2015) Horizontal gene transfer: building the
web of life. Nat. Rev. Genet. 16, 472–482

Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month 2021, Vol. xx, No. xx

41.
42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.
49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

63.

64.
65.

66.

McInerney, J.O. et al. (2017) Why prokaryotes have pangenomes.
Nat. Microbiol. 2, 17040
Pang, T.Y. and Lercher, M.J. (2019) Each of 3323 metabolic innovations in the evolution of E. coli arose through the horizontal transfer of a single DNA segment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 116,
187–192
Power, J.J. et al. (2021) Adaptive evolution of hybrid bacteria
by horizontal gene transfer. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
118, e2007873118
Gogarten, J.P. and Townsend, J.P. (2005) Horizontal gene
transfer, genome innovation, and evolution. Nat. Rev.
Microbiol. 3, 679–687
Slomka, S. et al. (2020) Experimental evolution of Bacillus
subtilis reveals the evolutionary dynamics of horizontal gene
transfer and suggests adaptive and neutral effects. Genetics
216, 543–558
Rocha, E.P.C. (2018) Neutral theory, microbial practice: challenges in bacterial population genetics. Mol. Biol. Evol. 35,
1338–1347
Carroll, A.C. and Wong, A. (2018) Plasmid persistence: costs,
beneﬁts, and the plasmid paradox. Can. J. Microbiol. 64,
293–304
Iranzo, J. et al. (2016) Inevitability of genetic parasites. Genome
Biol. Evol. 8, 2856–2869
Hall, J.P.J. et al. (2017) Sampling the mobile gene pool: innovation via horizontal gene transfer in bacteria. Philos. Trans. R.
Soc. B 5, 372
Ely, B. (2020) Recombination and gene loss occur simultaneously during bacterial horizontal gene transfer. PLoS One
15, e0227987
Iranzo, J. et al. (2017) Disentangling the effects of selection and
loss bias on gene dynamics. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
114, E5616–E5624
Whelan, F.J. et al. (2021) Evidence for selection in the abundant accessory gene content of a prokaryote pangenome.
Mol. Biol. Evol. 38, 3697–3708
Azarian, T. et al. (2020) Structure and dynamics of bacterial
populations: pangenome ecology. In The Pangenome:
Diversity, Dynamics and Evolution of Genomes (Tettelin,
H. and Medini, D., eds), Springer
Liao, J. et al. (2021) Nationwide genomic atlas of soil-dwelling
Listeria reveals effects of selection and population ecology on
pangenome evolution. Nat. Microbiol. 6, 1021–1030
Koonin, E.V. and Wolf, Y.I. (2008) Genomics of bacteria and
archaea: the emerging dynamic view of the prokaryotic
world. Nucleic Acids Res. 36, 6688–6719
Wang, M. et al. (2021) Selﬁshness driving reductive evolution
shapes interdependent patterns in spatially structured microbial
communities. ISME J. 15, 1387–1401
Stump, S.M. et al. (2018) Local interactions and self-organized
spatial patterns stabilize microbial cross-feeding against
cheaters. J. R. Soc. Interface 15, 20170822
Méric, G. et al. (2018) Lineage-speciﬁc plasmid acquisition and
the evolution of specialized pathogens in Bacillus thuringiensis
and the Bacillus cereus group. Mol. Ecol. 27, 1524–1540
Li, L. et al. (2020) Plasmids persist in a microbial community by providing ﬁtness beneﬁt to multiple phylotypes. ISME J. 14, 1170–1181
San Millan, A. and MacLean, R.C. (2017) Fitness costs of plasmids: a limit to plasmid transmission. Microbiol. Spectr. 5, 5
Hülter, N. et al. (2017) An evolutionary perspective on plasmid
lifestyle modes. Curr. Opin. Microbiol. 38, 74–80
Kottara, A. et al. (2018) Variable plasmid ﬁtness effects and
mobile genetic element dynamics across Pseudomonas species. FEMS Microbiol. Ecol. 94, ﬁx172
Harrison, E. et al. (2015) Parallel compensatory evolution stabilizes plasmids across the parasitism–mutualism continuum.
Curr. Biol. 25, 2034–2039
Lopatkin, A.J. et al. (2017) Persistence and reversal of plasmidmediated antibiotic resistance. Nat. Commun. 8, 1689
Woods, L.C. et al. (2020) Horizontal gene transfer potentiates adaptation by reducing selective constraints on the spread of genetic variation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 117, 26868–26875
van Dijk, B. et al. (2020) Slightly beneﬁcial genes are retained by
bacteria evolving DNA uptake despite selﬁsh elements. eLife 9,
e56801

Trends in Ecology & Evolution
OPEN ACCESS

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

84.
85.

86.
87.

88.
89.

90.

91.

92.

93.

Hall, J.P.J. et al. (2016) Source-sink plasmid transfer dynamics
maintain gene mobility in soil bacterial communities. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 113, 8260–8265
Alonso-Del Valle, A. et al. (2021) Variability of plasmid ﬁtness
effects contributes to plasmid persistence in bacterial communities.
Nat. Commun. 12, 2653
Granato, E.T. and Kümmerli, R. (2017) The path to re-evolve
cooperation is constrained in Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
BMC Evol. Biol. 17, 214
Gonçalves, C. and Gonçalves, P. (2019) Multilayered horizontal
operon transfers from bacteria reconstruct a thiamine salvage
pathway in yeasts. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 116,
22219–22228
Pang, T.Y. and Lercher, M.J. (2017) Supra-operonic clusters of
functionally related genes (SOCs) are a source of horizontal
gene co-transfers. Sci. Rep. 7, 40294
Nielsen, T.K. et al. (2017) Evolution of sphingomonad gene
clusters related to pesticide catabolism revealed by genome
sequence and mobilomics of Sphingobium herbicidovorans
MH. Genome Biol. Evol. 9, 2477–2490
Staehlin, B.M. et al. (2016) Evolution of a heavy metal homeostasis/
resistance island reﬂects increasing copper stress in Enterobacteria.
Genome Biol. Evol. 8, 811–826
Touchon, M. and Rocha, E.P.C. (2016) Coevolution of the organization and structure of prokaryotic genomes. Cold Spring
Harb. Perspect. Biol. 8, a018168
Ballouz, S. et al. (2010) Conditions for the evolution of gene
clusters in bacterial genomes. PLoS Comput. Biol. 6,
e1000672
Eldakar, O.T. et al. (2013) When hawks give rise to doves: the
evolution and transition of enforcement strategies. Evolution
67, 1549–1560
Ågren, J.A. et al. (2019) Enforcement is central to the evolution
of cooperation. Nat. Ecol. Evol. 3, 1018–1029
Hamilton, W.D. (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I.
J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1–16
Hamilton, W.D. (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. II.
J. Theor. Biol. 7, 17–52
Levin, S.R. and Grafen, A. (2021) Extending the range of additivity in using inclusive ﬁtness. Ecol. Evol. 11, 1970–1983
Gardner, A. et al. (2011) The genetical theory of kin selection.
J. Evol. Biol. 24, 1020–1043
Colizzi, E.S. and Hogeweg, P. (2016) High cost enhances
cooperation through the interplay between evolution and
self-organisation. BMC Evol. Biol. 16, 31
Colizzi, E.S. and Hogeweg, P. (2016) Parasites sustain and enhance RNA-like replicators through spatial self-organisation.
PLoS Comput. Biol. 12, e1004902
Smith, P. et al. (2019) Bacterial cheaters evade punishment by
cyanide. iScience 19, 101–109
Wechsler, T. et al. (2019) Understanding policing as a mechanism of cheater control in cooperating bacteria. J. Evol. Biol.
32, 412–424
Stilwell, P. et al. (2020) Resource heterogeneity and the evolution of public goods cooperation. Evol. Lett. 4, 155–163
Kümmerli, R. et al. (2010) Repression of competition favours
cooperation: experimental evidence from bacteria. J. Evol.
Biol. 23, 699–706
Smith, J. (2001) The social evolution of bacterial pathogenesis.
Proc. R. Soc. B 268, 61–69
Nogueira, T. et al. (2009) Horizontal gene transfer of the
secretome drives the evolution of bacterial cooperation and virulence. Curr. Biol. 19, 1683–1691
Garcia-Garcera, M. and Rocha, E.P.C. (2020) Community
diversity and habitat structure shape the repertoire of extracellular proteins in bacteria. Nat. Commun. 11, 758
van Dijk, B. and Hogeweg, P. (2016) In silico gene-level evolution explains microbial population diversity through differential
gene mobility. Genome Biol. Evol. 8, 176–188
Dimitriu, T. et al. (2014) Genetic information transfer promotes
cooperation in bacteria. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 111,
11103–11108
Lehtinen, S. et al. (2021) Evolutionary mechanisms that determine which bacterial genes are carried on plasmids. Evol.
Lett. 5, 290–301

94.
95.

96.

97.

98.

99.

100.
101.
102.

103.
104.
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.

110.

111.

112.
113.

114.
115.

116.

117.

118.
119.

120.
121.

van Dijk, B. (2020) Can mobile genetic elements rescue genes
from extinction? Curr. Genet. 66, 1069–1071
Dewar, A. et al. (2021) Plasmids facilitate pathogenicity, not cooperation, in bacteria, Research Square Published online
March 01, 2021. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-257679/v1
Bakkeren, E. et al. (2021) Cooperative virulence can emerge via
horizontal gene transfer but is stabilized by transmission.
bioRxiv Published online February 12, 2021. https://doi.org/
10.1101/2021.02.11.430745
Rodríguez-Rubio, L. et al. (2020) Extensive antimicrobial
resistance mobilization via multicopy plasmid encapsidation
mediated by temperate phages. J. Antimicrob. Chemother.
75, 3173–3180
Ramsay, J.P. and Firth, N. (2017) Diverse mobilization
strategies facilitate transfer of non-conjugative mobile genetic
elements. Curr. Opin. Microbiol. 38, 1–9
Bayramoglu, B. et al. (2017) Bet-hedging in bacteriocin producing Escherichia coli populations: the single cell perspective.
Sci. Rep. 7, 42068
Cooney, D.B. (2019) The replicator dynamics for multilevel
selection in evolutionary games. J. Math. Biol. 79, 101–154
Geyrhofer, L. and Brenner, N. (2020) Coexistence and cooperation in structured habitats. BMC Ecol. 20, 14
Henriques, G.J.B. et al. (2021) Multilevel selection favors fragmentation modes that maintain cooperative interactions in multispecies communities. PLoS Comput. Biol. 17, e1008896
Mc Ginty, S.É. et al. (2011) Horizontal gene transfer and the
evolution of bacterial cooperation. Evolution 65, 21–32
Mitteldorf, J. and Wilson, D.S. (2000) Population viscosity and
the evolution of altruism. J. Theor. Biol. 204, 481–496
Powers, S.T. et al. (2011) The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it. Evolution 65,
1527–1543
Lee, H.-W. et al. (2018) Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games
coevolving on adaptive networks. J. Complex Netw. 6, 1–23
Garcia, T. et al. (2015) The evolution of adhesiveness as a
social adaptation. Elife 4, e08595
Kreft, J.-U. (2004) Bioﬁlms promote altruism. Microbiology
(Reading) 150, 2751–2760
Dimitriu, T. et al. (2018) Selection of horizontal gene transfer
through public good production. bioRxiv Published online
May 07, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1101/315960
Dimitriu, T. et al. (2016) Indirect ﬁtness beneﬁts enable the
spread of host genes promoting costly transfer of beneﬁcial
plasmids. PLoS Biol. 14, e1002478
Dimitriu, T. et al. (2019) Bacteria from natural populations transfer plasmids mostly towards their kin. Proc. R. Soc. B 286,
20191110
Lyons, N.A. et al. (2016) A combinatorial kin discrimination system in Bacillus subtilis. Curr. Biol. 26, 733–742
Santos, A.L.S.D. et al. (2018) What are the advantages of living
in a community? A microbial bioﬁlm perspective! Mem. Inst.
Oswaldo Cruz 113, e180212
Drescher, K. et al. (2014) Solutions to the public goods
dilemma in bacterial bioﬁlms. Curr. Biol. 24, 50–55
Abe, K. et al. (2020) Bioﬁlms: hot spots of horizontal gene
transfer (HGT) in aquatic environments, with a focus on a
new HGT mechanism. FEMS Microbiol. Ecol. 96, ﬁaa031
Lécuyer, F. et al. (2018) Bioﬁlm formation drives transfer of the
conjugative element ICEBs1 in Bacillus subtilis. mSphere 3,
e00473–e00518
Røder, H.L. et al. (2021) Bioﬁlms can act as plasmid reserves in
the absence of plasmid speciﬁc selection. npj Bioﬁlms
Microbiomes 7, 78
Cook, L.C. and Dunny, G.M. (2014) The inﬂuence of bioﬁlms in
the biology of plasmids. Microbiol. Spectr. 2, 5
Madsen, J.S. et al. (2012) The interconnection between bioﬁlm
formation and horizontal gene transfer. FEMS Immunol. Med.
Microbiol. 65, 183–195
Gama, J.A. et al. (2020) Dominance between plasmids determines the extent of bioﬁlm formation. Front. Microbiol. 11, 2070
Nakao, R. et al. (2018) Enhanced bioﬁlm formation and
membrane vesicle release by Escherichia coli expressing a
commonly occurring plasmid gene, kil. Front. Microbiol. 9,
2605

Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month 2021, Vol. xx, No. xx

9

Trends in Ecology & Evolution
OPEN ACCESS

122. Cook, L.C. and Dunny, G.M. (2013) Effects of bioﬁlm growth on
plasmid copy number and expression of antibiotic resistance
genes in Enterococcus faecalis. Antimicrob. Agents Chemother.
57, 1850–1856
123. Stalder, T. et al. (2020) Evolving populations in bioﬁlms contain
more persistent plasmids. Mol. Biol. Evol. 37, 1563–1576
124. Molin, S. and Tolker-Nielsen, T. (2003) Gene transfer occurs
with enhanced efﬁciency in bioﬁlms and induces enhanced
stabilisation of the bioﬁlm structure. Curr. Opin. Biotechnol.
14, 255–261
125. Amanatidou, E. et al. (2019) Bioﬁlms facilitate cheating and
social exploitation of β-lactam resistance in Escherichia coli.
npj Bioﬁlms Microbiomes 5, 36
126. Yamagishi, T. (1986) The provision of a sanctioning system as a
public good. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 110–116
127. Korman, A. and Vacus, R. (2021) On the role of hypocrisy in
escaping the tragedy of the commons. Sci. Rep. 11, 17585
128. Battu, B. (2021) Evolution of altruistic punishments among
heterogeneous conditional cooperators. Sci. Rep. 11, 10502
129. Salahshour, M. (2021) Evolution of prosocial punishment
in unstructured and structured populations and in
the presence of antisocial punishment. PLoS One 16,
e0254860

10

Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Month 2021, Vol. xx, No. xx

130. Frénoy, A. et al. (2017) Second-order cooperation: cooperative offspring as a living public good arising from second-order selection on
non-cooperative individuals. Evolution 71, 1802–1814
131. Harrison, F. and Buckling, A. (2007) High relatedness selects
against hypermutability in bacterial metapopulations. Proc.
Biol. Sci. 274, 1341–1347
132. O’Brien, S. et al. (2013) The evolution of bacterial mutation
rates under simultaneous selection by interspeciﬁc and social
parasitism. Proc. R. Soc. B 280, 20131913
133. Ma, K. et al. (2018) Fitness cost of a mcr-1-carrying IncHI2
plasmid. PLoS One 13, e0209706
134. Di Luca, M.C. et al. (2017) Low biological cost of
carbapenemase-encoding plasmids following transfer from
Klebsiella pneumoniae to Escherichia coli. J. Antimicrob.
Chemother. 72, 85–89
135. Gama, J.A. et al. (2020) Plasmid interactions can improve plasmid
persistence in bacterial populations. Front. Microbiol. 11, 2033
136. Dimitriu, T. et al. (2019) Negative frequency dependent selection on plasmid carriage and low ﬁtness costs maintain
extended spectrum β-lactamases in Escherichia coli. Sci.
Rep. 9, 17211
137. Hall, R.J. et al. (2020) Horizontal gene transfer as a source of conﬂict and cooperation in prokaryotes. Front. Microbiol. 11, 1569

